Supreme Court has set the stage for a final hearing on a batch of petitions contesting key provisions of the Places of Worship Act, 1991, a statute that freezes the religious character of places of worship as they stood on August 15, 1947, and bars fresh suits seeking to alter that status.A Bench led by the Chief Justice indicated that the matter, which has wide constitutional and political implications, will be listed for detailed arguments after preliminary issues were addressed. The petitions question the validity of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, arguing that they curtail the right to judicial remedy and impose an arbitrary cut-off date that forecloses claims relating to religious sites.
Enacted in the backdrop of heightened communal tensions in the early 1990s, the 1991 law mandates that the character of a place of worship shall remain as it existed on Independence Day. Section 4 bars courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding that seeks conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, and also abates pending proceedings. The only explicit exception carved out in the statute concerns the dispute over the site in Ayodhya, which was already the subject of litigation at the time.
Petitioners, including political leaders, religious bodies and private individuals, have contended that the law violates the Constitution by extinguishing remedies available under Articles 25 and 26, which guarantee freedom of religion, and by limiting access to courts under Article 32. Some have argued that the Act prevents adjudication even in cases where evidence may show that a religious structure was altered in the past, thereby denying what they describe as a corrective legal process.
The Union government, in earlier affidavits, has defended the statute as a legislative measure aimed at preserving public order and maintaining secularism. It has submitted that the law embodies a commitment to non-retrogression in matters of faith and is designed to prevent the reopening of historical grievances that could destabilise communal harmony.
The issue has gained renewed attention amid ongoing proceedings in various courts relating to the Gyanvapi mosque complex in Varanasi and the Shahi Idgah mosque in Mathura, where civil suits have sought surveys or declarations regarding the character of the sites. While those matters turn on specific facts and procedural questions, the broader constitutional validity of the 1991 Act underpins much of the legal debate.
Legal scholars note that the Supreme Court, in its 2019 judgment in the Ayodhya title dispute, described the Places of Worship Act as a legislative intervention that “protects and secures the fundamental values of the Constitution”. The court observed at the time that the statute enforces the constitutional commitment to secularism by preventing attempts to alter the status quo of religious sites.
At the same time, the present petitions argue that the Act goes beyond preserving public order and amounts to an absolute bar on judicial scrutiny. Senior advocates appearing for some petitioners have told the court that Parliament cannot abrogate a citizen’s right to seek adjudication of a civil claim, particularly where property rights and religious freedoms intersect.
The listing of the matter for final hearing suggests that the court intends to settle the constitutional questions in a comprehensive manner. Observers point out that any ruling could have far-reaching implications, not only for pending disputes but also for the broader relationship between history, faith and law in a plural society.
The political context surrounding the statute remains sensitive. When the Act was passed in 1991 under the government of P. V. Narasimha Rao, it was presented as part of a framework to reassure minorities and stabilise communal relations following the mobilisation around Ayodhya. The demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 intensified scrutiny of the legal and political safeguards intended to protect places of worship.
Supporters of the law maintain that reopening historical claims risks fuelling sectarian tensions and undermining social cohesion. They argue that the August 15, 1947 benchmark represents a pragmatic compromise, anchoring disputes to a fixed point in time to prevent endless litigation over medieval or colonial-era events.