China has proposed an economic corridor connecting its south-western Yunnan province with Bangladesh through conflict-torn Myanmar, reviving a regional connectivity plan with far-reaching commercial and strategic implications.
The China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor was discussed during Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s official visit to Beijing in June. China offered to support its development as part of broader cooperation covering ports, transport infrastructure, artificial intelligence, healthcare, education and green technology.
The proposed route would begin around Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, enter Myanmar through the border trade network and pass towards Mandalay before extending westwards to Bangladesh. Potential links to the ports of Chattogram and Mongla would give western China another outlet towards the Bay of Bengal.
No detailed route map, financing package or construction timetable has been announced. Bangladesh is examining the proposal, while the initiative will require Myanmar’s participation and control over territory crossed by any road, rail or energy infrastructure.
For Beijing, the project could strengthen Yunnan’s role as a gateway between China, South Asia and Southeast Asia. The landlocked province depends heavily on long routes through China’s eastern and southern ports for international trade. Better access to the Bay of Bengal could shorten journeys for selected cargo and support industrial development across China’s interior.
The corridor would supplement, rather than replace, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which connects Yunnan with Mandalay and Myanmar’s western coast. That network includes oil and gas pipelines and plans for rail links, industrial zones and a deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State.
China has also developed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, linking Xinjiang with Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. A route towards Bangladesh would broaden Beijing’s commercial options across the northern Indian Ocean and deepen its role in the infrastructure networks surrounding India.
Bangladesh sees potential gains from expanded trade, investment and transport connectivity. Dhaka has urged Beijing to import more Bangladeshi products and accelerate infrastructure schemes, reflecting concern over a wide bilateral trade imbalance.
China imported about $1.3 billion worth of goods from Bangladesh last year, while Chinese exports to the country were many times larger. Bangladesh’s main sales included human hair used in wig manufacturing, cotton yarn, jute products, garments, leather goods and seafood.
Dhaka is seeking greater access for pharmaceuticals, agricultural produce and manufactured goods. An efficient corridor could lower logistics costs, attract factories serving regional markets and provide new business for ports and economic zones.
Bangladesh joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 and has received Chinese loans and investment for power plants, bridges, tunnels and transport projects. It owes China about $6.2 billion, while the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has extended further financing.
The government is nevertheless expected to assess the corridor’s debt, environmental and security implications carefully. Large cross-border projects can face delays when commercial assumptions, customs systems and political priorities differ between participating countries.
Myanmar’s civil war presents the greatest obstacle. The military seized power in February 2021, triggering nationwide resistance and an armed conflict involving pro-democracy forces and numerous ethnic organisations.
Government troops no longer exercise uninterrupted control over many border areas and strategic highways. Armed groups have captured crossings, towns and sections of trade routes connecting Myanmar with China, Bangladesh, India and Thailand.
Rakhine State is especially important because it borders Bangladesh and contains Kyaukpyu, a centrepiece of China’s access strategy. The Arakan Army controls much of the state and has seized Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh, meaning that any western branch of the corridor could require understandings extending beyond the authorities in Naypyidaw.
Fighting, air strikes, landmines, displacement and damaged roads would increase construction costs and expose workers to danger. Investors would also face uncertainty over which administration could enforce contracts, protect assets and collect customs revenue.
China retains influence with Myanmar’s military leadership and several ethnic armed organisations. Beijing has pushed ceasefires near its border when clashes threatened trade routes, citizens or infrastructure, while continuing to support the China-Myanmar corridor.
New Delhi is watching the proposal because it revives elements of the earlier Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor without India. That project envisaged links from Kunming through Mandalay, Dhaka and Kolkata but lost momentum amid disagreements over the Belt and Road Initiative and worsening China-India relations.
