US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that he was “permanently” opening the Strait of Hormuz, framing the move as a benefit for China as well as the wider world, as Washington presses ahead with efforts to restore shipping through one of the most critical energy chokepoints on the planet. The remark, made in a Truth Social post, came as maritime traffic through the strait remained constrained and the practical meaning of his claim was still unclear. Trump wrote that “China is very happy” with the decision and added that he was doing it “for them, also – And the World”. He later told Fox Business that he had written to President Xi Jinping asking Beijing not to supply weapons to Iran, and said Xi had responded by denying any such shipments. The White House has cast the Hormuz issue as part of a wider campaign to squeeze Tehran economically while trying to force new negotiations after a breakdown in ceasefire talks.
The statement matters because the Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint, handling roughly a fifth of global petroleum liquids flows, with liquefied natural gas shipments from the Gulf also heavily dependent on the passage. Any disruption quickly feeds into crude prices, freight insurance, fuel costs and broader inflation expectations. Asia is especially exposed, and China stands out because Middle East Gulf supplies account for just over half of its seaborne crude imports, making the waterway central to its energy security.
That helps explain why Trump singled out China. Beijing has not been a formal partner in the US-led pressure campaign on Iran, and relations between Washington and Beijing remain strained on trade, technology and security. Yet both capitals have a strong interest in preventing a prolonged shutdown of Gulf shipping lanes. China has built large crude stockpiles that can cushion short-term shocks, but the longer the disruption lasts, the greater the pressure on refiners, manufacturers and fuel-dependent regional economies tied to Chinese trade.
Still, Trump’s claim of having “permanently” opened the strait goes beyond what has been established publicly. Reuters reported this week that it remains unclear how such an outcome would be executed, and other reporting has indicated that navigation is still heavily restricted rather than fully normalised. On April 10, Trump had said the United States would have the strait open “fairly soon”. A day later, US military officials said they were setting conditions to clear mines and create a safer passage for commercial vessels, suggesting the operation was still in progress rather than complete.
The chronology underlines how fluid the situation remains. After the Iran war erupted in late February, Tehran moved to disrupt traffic through Hormuz, producing a severe shock to oil and gas supply chains. Diplomatic contacts later yielded a fragile ceasefire, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled, and Washington answered by imposing a blockade on Iranian ports rather than simply declaring the sea lane secure. That distinction is important: blocking Iranian trade is not the same thing as guaranteeing unimpeded passage for all shipping, especially if insurers, shipowners and crews still see the route as a combat-risk zone.
Reports from the Gulf have reinforced that point. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company chief Sultan Al Jaber said earlier this month that access through Hormuz was still “restricted, conditioned and controlled”, with hundreds of vessels waiting in the Gulf. Associated Press reporting has also shown Iran-linked ships turning back under pressure from the US naval blockade, while uncertainty persists over what cargoes qualify as neutral or humanitarian. For traders and charterers, those operational details matter more than political messaging because they determine whether energy flows can resume at anything like normal levels.
Trump’s language also fits a broader political narrative in which he presents military and economic coercion as producing fast, decisive gains. Supporters will argue that the combination of naval force, sanctions and direct pressure on Beijing has already started to shift behaviour and could shorten the crisis. Critics, however, say the rhetoric risks outrunning events on the ground and may blur the line between deterrence, blockade and de-escalation at a moment when markets are highly sensitive to every signal from Washington, Tehran and Beijing.