Ghalibaf’s intervention matters because it shifts the conversation from a single chokepoint to the possibility of a twin-pressure strategy spanning two of the world’s most sensitive sea lanes. Reports on Friday said he framed the idea in a series of public questions on X, implying that if opponents continue to challenge Iran, Bab el-Mandeb could become another lever. That would deepen anxiety already visible across energy and freight markets after the fighting around Iran and the Gulf drove insurers, shipowners and commodity traders to price in prolonged disruption.
Hormuz sits at the heart of that fear. The strait, between Iran and Oman, carries a large share of globally traded crude and liquefied natural gas, and there are limited alternatives for moving comparable volumes out of the Gulf if traffic is obstructed. Reporting over the past week has shown that the route is not uniformly closed to all shipping, but it has become a selective corridor in which political alignment appears to affect passage. The transit this week of a French-owned CMA CGM vessel suggested that countries seen by Tehran as less hostile may still find a narrow path through, even as the wider route remains under severe strain.
Bab el-Mandeb would be a dangerous next step because of its role as the maritime entrance to the Suez route from the south. The passage links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, making it indispensable for cargo moving between Asia, the Gulf, Europe and the Mediterranean. According to the U. S. Energy Information Administration, much of the petroleum headed through the Suez Canal or the SUMED pipeline must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb, meaning simultaneous pressure on Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb would hit supply chains on both the export and onward shipping legs.
That scenario also revives memories of the Red Sea security crisis, when attacks linked to Yemen’s Houthis forced many shipping lines to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, adding time and cost to voyages. Analysts have long warned that even sporadic attacks or credible threats around Bab el-Mandeb can send insurance premiums sharply higher and reduce vessel availability. If Hormuz remains politically restricted while Bab el-Mandeb turns kinetic, the combined effect would likely stretch beyond oil into consumer goods, industrial inputs and container schedules already vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.
The emerging pattern also underlines how Tehran may be trying to exploit geography rather than chase a conventional naval contest. By preserving limited access for some ships while signalling the ability to widen the crisis, Iran can keep opponents guessing, reward states it regards as neutral, and test how far global powers are willing to go to reopen maritime routes by force. That ambiguity is central to the pressure campaign: a complete closure would invite a direct response, while selective disruption can still squeeze markets and fracture diplomatic coalitions.
For Gulf producers and major importers in Asia and Europe, the risk is no longer confined to one flashpoint. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have alternative pipelines and ports, but Reuters reported this week that millions of barrels a day remain exposed despite diversion efforts, and physical fuel markets in Asia have already reacted sharply. A threat against Bab el-Mandeb would also place renewed focus on Egypt’s Suez revenues, European supply chains, and the cost burden on shipping firms that have spent months navigating conflict premiums from the Red Sea to the Gulf.