Audit identifies Bengal-specific restrictions within ECINET portal code
A third-party examination of ECINET has identified code capable of withholding two electoral-roll functions from registration officers in West Bengal, raising questions about their access to voter records and hearing proceedings.
The examination by civic-technology initiative Charchagram found that Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) and Assistant Electoral Registration Officers (AEROs) in West Bengal were singled out for exclusion from the “View Enumeration Form Details” function and the notice-and-hearing dashboard. Equivalent exclusions for officers in other states were not identified.
The finding concerns the publicly accessible front-end software, rather than confirmed restrictions on officers using authenticated accounts. Researchers could not establish whether the condition was activated in practice, whether corresponding server-side controls existed or when the provision first entered the software.
Charchagram data scientist Saurav Rajput examined code on October 2, 6, 7 and 9. The relevant condition remained visible in a version retrieved on October 19, after a new application build was introduced on October 16. Rajput said he first observed the feature on September 28.
Rajput explained that the investigation examined JavaScript files delivered to browsers before login. It did not involve entering the portal through an official account, accessing protected records or making requests to restricted services. Consequently, the findings describe how the interface is programmed, not necessarily what any individual officer could actually access.
The enumeration-form function ordinarily provides information needed to examine a voter's registration record. Its fields include the constituency, polling part, serial number, elector's name and identification number, the person submitting the form, supporting documents and recommendations from booth-level officers.
The interface also contains fields for documents associated with EROs and AEROs and for hearing orders. Available actions include returning an application to a booth-level officer and identifying electors linked to an earlier special intensive revision of electoral rolls.
The second affected function, the notice-and-hearing dashboard, is intended to support the processing and tracking of notices and hearing-related decisions. Both functions are relevant to the responsibilities assigned to registration officers during electoral-roll verification.
The Election Commission of India had not provided a response to questions about the audit when the findings became public. There was therefore no official explanation establishing whether the Bengal-specific condition reflected an operational policy, a temporary configuration or an unused software provision.
The disclosure follows disputes over the special intensive revision in West Bengal, where the verification exercise began in November 2025. The process involved scrutiny of electoral records and notices to people whose details could not be matched with earlier rolls or were flagged for discrepancies.
On February 20, the Supreme Court assigned pending verification hearings to judicial officers after difficulties arose in completing the exercise. A further order on February 24 addressed the scale of outstanding cases and the responsibilities of registration officials assisting the judicial process.
That order placed responsibility on EROs and AEROs to satisfy presiding judicial officers concerning submitted documents. Supreme Court advocate Harshit Anand said an operational restriction preventing those officials from examining relevant forms could conflict with the court's directions and impede the verification process.
His assessment was conditional on the software provision actually restricting access. The public code examination alone does not demonstrate that officials were prevented from discharging duties imposed by statute or judicial orders.
Trinamool Congress parliamentarian Abhishek Banerjee had alleged in February that registration officers in West Bengal could no longer monitor the progress of assistant officers through ECINET. He questioned the arrangement under provisions of the Representation of the People Act governing the preparation of electoral rolls and supervision of assistant officers.
Separately, the Election Commission announced in September that a committee involving an independent technical expert would examine ECINET's compliance with electoral laws and rules. The Commission maintained that field officials received access according to their statutory responsibilities and rejected allegations that registration officers were being locked out.
The Bengal revision generated substantial litigation over exclusions and appeals. Judicial officers completed a major verification exercise in April, while challenges to deletions and inclusions continued before designated appellate tribunals.
The original state revision timetable required registration officers to examine notices, verify supporting documents and decide claims and objections. It also directed them to ensure that eligible electors were not excluded and ineligible names were not retained. The timetable separately identified the enumeration, draft publication, hearing and final-roll stages, assigning registration officers responsibility for decisions on disputed entries.
The examination by civic-technology initiative Charchagram found that Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) and Assistant Electoral Registration Officers (AEROs) in West Bengal were singled out for exclusion from the “View Enumeration Form Details” function and the notice-and-hearing dashboard. Equivalent exclusions for officers in other states were not identified.
The finding concerns the publicly accessible front-end software, rather than confirmed restrictions on officers using authenticated accounts. Researchers could not establish whether the condition was activated in practice, whether corresponding server-side controls existed or when the provision first entered the software.
Charchagram data scientist Saurav Rajput examined code on October 2, 6, 7 and 9. The relevant condition remained visible in a version retrieved on October 19, after a new application build was introduced on October 16. Rajput said he first observed the feature on September 28.
Rajput explained that the investigation examined JavaScript files delivered to browsers before login. It did not involve entering the portal through an official account, accessing protected records or making requests to restricted services. Consequently, the findings describe how the interface is programmed, not necessarily what any individual officer could actually access.
The enumeration-form function ordinarily provides information needed to examine a voter's registration record. Its fields include the constituency, polling part, serial number, elector's name and identification number, the person submitting the form, supporting documents and recommendations from booth-level officers.
The interface also contains fields for documents associated with EROs and AEROs and for hearing orders. Available actions include returning an application to a booth-level officer and identifying electors linked to an earlier special intensive revision of electoral rolls.
The second affected function, the notice-and-hearing dashboard, is intended to support the processing and tracking of notices and hearing-related decisions. Both functions are relevant to the responsibilities assigned to registration officers during electoral-roll verification.
The Election Commission of India had not provided a response to questions about the audit when the findings became public. There was therefore no official explanation establishing whether the Bengal-specific condition reflected an operational policy, a temporary configuration or an unused software provision.
The disclosure follows disputes over the special intensive revision in West Bengal, where the verification exercise began in November 2025. The process involved scrutiny of electoral records and notices to people whose details could not be matched with earlier rolls or were flagged for discrepancies.
On February 20, the Supreme Court assigned pending verification hearings to judicial officers after difficulties arose in completing the exercise. A further order on February 24 addressed the scale of outstanding cases and the responsibilities of registration officials assisting the judicial process.
That order placed responsibility on EROs and AEROs to satisfy presiding judicial officers concerning submitted documents. Supreme Court advocate Harshit Anand said an operational restriction preventing those officials from examining relevant forms could conflict with the court's directions and impede the verification process.
His assessment was conditional on the software provision actually restricting access. The public code examination alone does not demonstrate that officials were prevented from discharging duties imposed by statute or judicial orders.
Trinamool Congress parliamentarian Abhishek Banerjee had alleged in February that registration officers in West Bengal could no longer monitor the progress of assistant officers through ECINET. He questioned the arrangement under provisions of the Representation of the People Act governing the preparation of electoral rolls and supervision of assistant officers.
Separately, the Election Commission announced in September that a committee involving an independent technical expert would examine ECINET's compliance with electoral laws and rules. The Commission maintained that field officials received access according to their statutory responsibilities and rejected allegations that registration officers were being locked out.
The Bengal revision generated substantial litigation over exclusions and appeals. Judicial officers completed a major verification exercise in April, while challenges to deletions and inclusions continued before designated appellate tribunals.
The original state revision timetable required registration officers to examine notices, verify supporting documents and decide claims and objections. It also directed them to ensure that eligible electors were not excluded and ineligible names were not retained. The timetable separately identified the enumeration, draft publication, hearing and final-roll stages, assigning registration officers responsibility for decisions on disputed entries.