Iran’s warning that it could impose fees on submarine internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz has opened a new front in the contest over one of the world’s most sensitive corridors, extending Tehran’s pressure tactics from energy shipping to digital infrastructure.
The proposal, promoted by state-linked outlets and military-aligned voices, would require foreign technology companies and cable operators to accept charges, regulatory conditions and maintenance arrangements tied to Iran’s claimed authority over parts of the waterway’s seabed. It has not yet become a formal, enforceable regime, but the threat has sharpened concern among governments, telecom operators and digital-economy planners across the Gulf and Asia.
At the centre of the issue is the 40-kilometre strait between Iran and Oman, long viewed as a critical passage for oil and gas exports. The same narrow geography also carries fibre-optic systems that support internet traffic, financial transactions, cloud services, telecom networks and data flows linking the Gulf with Europe, Asia and Africa. Several key systems, including AAE-1, FALCON and Gulf Bridge International, serve countries across the region, with landing points connected to the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran and markets further east and west.
Subsea cables carry about 99 per cent of international internet traffic, making them central to the functioning of modern finance, logistics, media, cloud computing and remote services. Gulf economies have poured billions into artificial intelligence, data centres and digital platforms as part of diversification strategies, and uninterrupted high-capacity connectivity has become a core part of that model.
Iranian-linked commentary has argued that Tehran could treat the cable routes as a source of strategic revenue, comparing the idea with fees associated with Egypt’s cable and transit infrastructure. Specialists say the comparison is weak because many cables crossing Egypt pass through territory and landing facilities under Cairo’s control, while the Hormuz systems mostly run offshore and do not depend on Iran as a landing state.
Legal and technical barriers are substantial. The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, and attempts to impose unilateral fees on traffic that does not land in Iran would face strong legal objections. Separating data traffic by company would also be impractical because submarine cables carry mixed flows from multiple operators, platforms and users. Sanctions further complicate any arrangement requiring global technology companies to transact with Iranian-controlled entities.
The greater risk lies less in the collection of fees than in the threat of disruption. A deliberate attack on cables would mark a major escalation and could expose Iran to military, diplomatic and economic retaliation. Experts in internet infrastructure say cable cutting is technically possible but difficult to conduct covertly in a heavily monitored waterway where US and allied surveillance assets are active. Any operation would be treated as hostile action against critical infrastructure.
Accidental damage remains the more common cause of cable faults worldwide. Fishing activity, ship anchors and seabed hazards account for most failures, with the global industry handling scores of incidents each year. Conflict, however, increases the danger by placing damaged vessels, drifting anchors, mines, insurance restrictions and military exclusion zones near vital routes. Repair ships require permits, safe passage and predictable conditions, all of which can be disrupted during hostilities.
A major cable break in Hormuz would not necessarily shut down the global internet, but it could slow or interrupt services across Gulf markets and affect banks, exchanges, energy firms, logistics operators, call centres and cloud-dependent businesses. Operators with alternative land routes and redundant cable capacity would be better protected than smaller providers relying on limited paths. Satellite networks could support emergency communications but cannot replace the scale, speed and cost efficiency of fibre-optic systems.
The threat also carries political signalling value. Tehran has long used Hormuz as leverage because of its role in energy flows. By invoking submarine cables, it is drawing attention to a less visible dependency that underpins the digital economy. The move is aimed at widening the perceived cost of pressure on Iran and reminding adversaries that the region’s vulnerabilities extend beyond tankers and pipelines.
Technology companies are unlikely to negotiate directly under threats that lack clear legal standing, while cable consortia and telecom carriers will focus on resilience planning, redundancy, route diversity and repair readiness. Gulf governments are expected to intensify monitoring of seabed infrastructure and accelerate investment in alternative paths through Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea and overland fibre routes.
