Pakistan’s bid to position itself as a go-between in the US-Iran war has run into a sharper challenge from Tehran, with commentary carried in Iran’s media space openly questioning Islamabad’s neutrality and putting unusual focus on Field Marshal Asim Munir’s role in shuttle diplomacy. The criticism has emerged at a delicate moment, as ceasefire management, maritime tensions and stalled negotiations have all raised the stakes for any intermediary claiming influence with both sides. The broader backdrop is no longer in doubt. Pakistan has become a visible channel between Washington and Tehran during the April war diplomacy, hosting direct talks in Islamabad and using its military and civilian leadership to keep lines open after a ceasefire was announced on 8 April. Munir has been central to that effort, travelling to Tehran and engaging with senior Iranian figures while also maintaining direct communication with the United States. That has elevated Pakistan’s diplomatic standing, but it has also exposed Islamabad to charges that it is too close to Washington to be a trusted broker in Tehran’s eyes.
Tension over that balancing act has been building for weeks. Tehran had already pushed back in late March against suggestions that Pakistan was successfully mediating, insisting that forums organised in Islamabad did not necessarily reflect Iranian participation or endorsement. That scepticism has now hardened into a more public challenge to Pakistan’s claimed impartiality, with media reports describing accusations that Islamabad has been playing both sides by presenting itself as a neutral messenger while leaning towards the US position in practice.
The immediate trigger appears to be a widening trust deficit over the substance of proposals moving between the two capitals. Reports circulating in South Asian and regional media say Iranian voices are frustrated that formal terms passed through Pakistan have not yielded a clear US response, while Washington has continued to press demands of its own and to maintain economic and maritime pressure. Whether every line attributed to Iranian television can be independently verified remains less clear, but the direction of travel is unmistakable: Tehran is signalling that it no longer wants Pakistan’s role to be treated as automatically benign or uncontested.
That matters because Pakistan’s mediation was never only about diplomatic prestige. Islamabad has strong material reasons to prevent the war from widening. A prolonged crisis in the Gulf threatens shipping, energy prices, remittance flows and border stability with Iran, all of which carry direct costs for Pakistan’s fragile economy and security environment. Analysts have also noted that Islamabad’s higher-profile role has helped it repair strategic ties with Washington after a period of strain, while allowing the military leadership to present Pakistan as an indispensable regional problem-solver. Those gains, however, depend on both sides continuing to see value in Pakistan’s involvement.
For Tehran, the calculation is harder and more politically charged. Iranian leaders have been managing not only military pressure but also domestic scrutiny over any negotiation seen as conceding too much while a blockade remains in place and clashes continue around the Strait of Hormuz. With the US maintaining restrictions on Iranian maritime trade and Iran responding forcefully at sea, public suspicion of intermediaries has intensified. In that climate, criticism aimed at Pakistan plays to a domestic audience as well as a foreign one, showing that Tehran will not allow another state to define the terms, tempo or optics of any settlement.
Pakistan, for its part, is unlikely to step back quickly. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Munir have both invested political capital in the role, and Washington has repeatedly acknowledged Pakistan’s usefulness in keeping a negotiating track alive even when talks have faltered. Yet the more the mediation becomes personalised around the army chief, the more vulnerable it is to direct attack. The latest rhetoric suggests Iran is no longer separating Pakistan’s institutional role from Munir’s personal diplomacy, a shift that could make future back-channel work more brittle and more public.