Iran and China are seeking to turn a shaky two-week ceasefire in the United States-Iran war into lasting strategic advantage, with Tehran tightening control over the Strait of Hormuz and Beijing positioned to benefit from any shift away from dollar-based energy trade. The most firmly established development is Iran’s push to regulate and charge for passage through the waterway, while the narrower claim that some payments may be sought in Chinese yuan has surfaced in parts of the press but is less widely confirmed than the broader tolling effort. That distinction matters because Hormuz remains one of the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoints. Around a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows through the strait, and any attempt by Tehran to convert military leverage into a more formal gatekeeping role carries consequences far beyond the Gulf. Reuters reported that shippers are still seeking clarity on how passage would work under the ceasefire, while AP said Iran’s proposal to collect tolls challenges long-established norms of navigational freedom in strategic straits.
The truce itself is narrow and unstable. Reuters said the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week pause brokered by Pakistan after roughly six weeks of conflict, but core disputes remain unresolved, including the future legal status of Hormuz and the scope of the ceasefire. Israel backed the pause in strikes on Iran while maintaining that Lebanon was not covered, a point rejected by Tehran and some mediators, leaving the region exposed to further escalation even as formal diplomacy is due to begin in Islamabad.
Against that backdrop, Iranian officials have moved to make access through Hormuz conditional rather than automatic. Reuters reported that vessels still require Iranian coordination for passage and that shipping companies remain wary despite the ceasefire. AP went further, describing a de facto system of diversion, vetting and fees already taking shape. Those measures stop short of a universally recognised legal toll regime, but they amount to a practical effort to monetise control over the corridor and to force commercial operators to treat Iranian approval as part of the cost of doing business.
China’s importance in this equation is both commercial and political. Reuters reported in March that China bought more than 80 per cent of Iran’s shipped oil in 2025, making it by far Tehran’s most important crude customer. Beijing has rejected unilateral sanctions and has long tolerated trade structures that obscure Iranian origin cargoes. That gives China an obvious incentive to support arrangements that keep Iranian barrels moving while reducing exposure to the US financial system. Even without formal confirmation that Hormuz fees are being settled in yuan across the board, the logic of yuan-denominated transactions fits an energy relationship already shaped by sanctions evasion, discounts and non-Western payment channels.
For Gulf producers and Asian importers, the danger is not only higher shipping costs but a structural change in market power. Reuters reported that oil majors, traders and refiners are testing the strait again, with Glencore and Taiwan’s CPC among those booking cargoes, yet insurers and operators still face war-risk premiums and uncertainty over safe transit. European officials have also warned that the energy shock linked to the conflict will not fade quickly. A toll-based or permit-based regime, even if partial and temporary, would leave buyers in Asia more dependent on Tehran’s discretion and more exposed to geopolitical bargaining.
Markets have already shown how sharply that leverage can move prices. Reuters and other outlets reported that oil prices fell after the ceasefire was announced, but they stayed vulnerable because the agreement did not restore full freedom of navigation. AP reported on Thursday that Iranian semi-official outlets published charts suggesting Revolutionary Guard mine placements in the strait, adding another layer of pressure on shipping. That combination — a nominal ceasefire, restricted movement, and the threat of renewed disruption — helps explain why Tehran appears intent on turning wartime control into peacetime bargaining power.