Government sources indicate that India emphasises a defence model centred on shared design and local manufacturing, rather than buy‑and‑fly acquisitions with limited industrial offsets—a clear pivot away from conventional U. S. platforms and towards self‑reliance under the “Make in India” initiative. Officials describe the F‑35’s price tag, roughly $80 million per aircraft, as prohibitive given high sustainment costs and its low interoperability with India’s largely Russian‑origin fleet.
Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh later confirmed that India is not engaged in formal negotiations with either the U. S. or Russia for fifth‑generation jets, including the F‑35A or Su‑57E, and is instead channeling its efforts into its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft programme, anticipated to take eight years to mature. The project has opened opportunities for private industry, with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited expected to be a key participant.
India’s emerging strategy aligns with the Air Force’s urgent need to reinvigorate its aerial combat capacity. With the aging MiG‑21 fleet retired and operational squadrons reduced to 31 from a sanctioned strength of 42, New Delhi aims to acquire 40 to 60 fifth‑generation jets while simultaneously building 114 fighters domestically under a multi‑vendor tender.
Despite the United States signalling readiness to escalate defence sales and eventually offer F‑35s starting in 2025, New Delhi has yet to initiate the formal acquisition process. U. S. officials described earlier comments by President Trump as “proposal stage” only and insisted that further steps would require government‑to‑government negotiations.
Domestic political opposition has also weighed in, with critics highlighting the aircraft’s high cost and limited technology transfer, even quoting Elon Musk’s disparaging remarks that called the F‑35 “obsolete” and “junk” in the drone era. Meanwhile, Russia has put forward an alternative offer to produce the Su‑57E under licence at HAL’s Nashik facility, including full technology transfer and integration of India’s own systems—an option more in tune with New Delhi’s industrial ambitions.
Trade tensions tied to U. S. protectionist measures have intensified uncertainty in bilateral defence talks. President Trump’s threat to penalise India’s purchase of Russian weapons and oil and his abrupt levying of a 25 percent punitive tariff effective 7 August have prompted New Delhi to suspend new defence acquisitions beyond existing commitments. Indian officials say they are exploring non‑defence imports like energy, telecom equipment and gold to narrow the trade imbalance, but have ruled out retaliation or new defence deals for now.
That tariff announcement reportedly blindsided officials in New Delhi, generating disquiet among those who had anticipated more diplomatic latitude following Modi’s engagement with Washington earlier in the year. From India’s standpoint, any future military collaboration is expected to offer real substance in terms of shared manufacturing and technology development—not mere status signalling.
Against a backdrop of growing strategic rivalry with China and intra‑regional balancing through the Quad partnership, India’s decision underscores a shift towards long‑term industrial autonomy and flexibility in defence sourcing amid rising friction with Washington.