In the United States, unfavourable opinions of China remain entrenched. A March 2025 Pew Research Centre poll shows 77 percent of American adults hold negative views, with one-third describing China as an outright enemy—down from nearly 42 percent in 2024, yet still a dominant sentiment. When asked which nation poses the greatest threat, 42 percent named China, cementing its position at the forefront of American security concerns.
Yet political affiliation colours these perceptions. Republicans remain more wary—86 percent express little to no confidence in President Xi Jinping, compared with 78 percent of Democrats. Even so, both camps have witnessed a subtle thaw. The proportion viewing China as an enemy declined by about eight points among Republicans and six among Democrats year-on-year, signalling a tentative chill in the previously frigid landscape of US-China sentiment.
Across Europe and the Asia-Pacific, skepticism runs deep. A Pew survey across 35 nations found a median 52 percent negative view of China in high-income countries—including Japan, Australia and Germany—compared to just 35 percent favourable sentiments. In Japan, unfavourable views exceed 80 percent, underscoring strong public resistance to China’s rising influence.
Heightened concern is not limited to public sentiment. The Alliance of Democracies Foundation's May 2025 Democracy Perception Index—based on feedback from over 111,000 respondents—revealed China’s net global perception improved to +14 percent, surpassing the United States, which fell to –5 percent. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, attributed America’s decline to its trade disputes and diplomatic friction, while Beijing’s cautiously managed diplomacy and emerging peace initiatives bolstered its image.
Still, this relative gain must be contextualised. Though global perception of China modestly improved—rising from +5 percent to +14 percent—it remains fragile amid widespread allegations of authoritarianism, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and assertive foreign policy. Indeed, 71 percent believe China contributes little to global peace, and 57 percent accuse it of meddling in other nations’ affairs.
Opinions vary markedly between economic strata. In 2024, middle‑income nations—such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa—were more receptive, with a 47 percent median viewing China’s economic influence positively; by contrast, 57 percent of high‑income nations saw China’s global economic impact negatively. Development-focused infrastructure investments—underpinned by the Belt and Road Initiative—have found favour among some leaders in these regions, even as democratic states voice reservations.
China’s soft power campaigns offer a mixed picture. “Stadium diplomacy” in Africa and its expanding cultural footprint—through technology platforms like TikTok—aim to enhance global goodwill. Yet, such efforts have struggled to counterbalance persistent concerns about China’s international role and domestic repression.
Human rights remain a persistent flashpoint. In multiple Western democracies, including Canada, Sweden, and the UK, seven-in-ten respondents say that China does little to support global peace or stability. Confidence in Xi Jinping to make sound decisions on world affairs hovers at a dismal 25 percent in high‑income countries. These trends are mirrored in Asia; Australia, Japan and South Korea report at least 80 percent unfavourable views of China.
The trade and tariff battlefront remains central to China’s image. Americans view Sino‑US economic relations as skewed in Beijing’s favour—46 percent report China as the main beneficiary. Although tariff hikes stirred concern—half of respondents doubted their benefit to the U.S.—many maintained negative views of China.
While Western publics express alarm, China’s neighbours craft nuanced stances. India’s unfavourable sentiment reached 67 percent in 2023, reflecting geopolitical strain; however, infrastructure cooperation through BRI continues across South Asia and Africa.
Economic headwinds inside China add complexity. Post‑COVID recovery has lagged, dampening global perceptions of China’s economic strength. While its tech sector garners respect—with 51 percent rating it above average—the broader global narrative now more often paints China as weak, not dominant.
China’s pursuit of strategic influence through diplomacy and investment contrasts sharply with prevailing perceptions of coercion. High‑income nations – perceiving China as interventionist – express a median 57 percent agreeing Beijing meddles excessively in foreign states. This sentiment is echoed by leaders wary of overreliance on Chinese markets and infrastructure.