Newly released documents suggest that Canadian authorities had prior knowledge of a potential plot targeting Air India months before the devastating bombing of Flight 182 in June 1985. The tragedy, which resulted in the deaths of 329 people, mostly of Indian descent, is regarded as one of the deadliest aviation-related terrorist attacks in history. Despite the warning, the attack was not prevented, raising serious questions about how Canadian security agencies handled intelligence at the time.
Details have emerged from intelligence reports showing that Canada’s security agencies, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), were aware of a growing threat posed by Sikh extremists in the early 1980s. Talwinder Singh Parmar, the mastermind behind the bombing and leader of the Babbar Khalsa militant group, was reportedly under surveillance long before the attack. His movement to Canada after being involved in violent activities in India added to the growing concern of possible retaliation against Indian interests.
Parmar, who sought the establishment of an independent Sikh state, was linked to several violent incidents in India. His extremist faction was particularly angered by India's crackdown on Sikh militants, following the 1984 storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, an event that inflamed tensions globally. Parmar's group eventually set its sights on Air India flights, viewing them as symbolic of the Indian government.
As early as March 1985, intelligence suggested a bombing attempt on an Air India flight originating from Canada. Authorities reportedly intercepted communications that indicated a plot, but the warning signals were not acted upon adequately. Internal miscommunication and inter-agency rivalry between the RCMP and CSIS further compounded the issue, leading to critical lapses in preventing the attack.
The tragedy occurred on June 23, 1985, when Air India Flight 182 exploded over the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Ireland, killing all passengers and crew on board. Simultaneously, another bomb intended for a second Air India flight exploded prematurely at Narita Airport in Japan, killing two baggage handlers. These coordinated attacks exposed serious weaknesses in Canada’s intelligence and security framework at the time.
The failure to stop the attack despite the warnings led to one of Canada’s most extensive investigations, which spanned over two decades. However, the criminal trial that followed was marked by significant challenges, including the destruction of key evidence and the reluctance of witnesses to testify. In the end, only Inderjit Singh Reyat, one of the conspirators, was convicted, while the two primary accused, Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri, were acquitted after a costly and lengthy trial.
In 2010, a Commission of Inquiry led by Justice John Major released its findings, concluding that a "cascade of errors" by Canadian authorities allowed the attack to take place. The inquiry pointed out multiple failures, from inadequate airport security measures to intelligence mishandling. The report also highlighted the lack of coordination between CSIS and the RCMP, which significantly hampered efforts to thwart the bombing. Justice Major criticized the government’s actions, emphasizing that the warning signs were missed despite the availability of credible intelligence.
Survivors and families of the victims have long criticized Canada for its slow response to justice. For years, they have sought accountability and answers from officials who failed to act on the intelligence received before the attack. The inquiry report, though comprehensive, has left many wondering why more wasn't done to prevent the tragedy despite clear indications of the looming threat.