With the Awami League barred from contesting under the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus, the field is formally open, yet power has consolidated rather than fragmented. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami have re-emerged as the principal contenders, each drawing on established party machinery, local networks and loyal voter bases. Against this backdrop, the National Citizen Party, widely known as the NCP, has struggled to define a clear constituency beyond the youthful activists who propelled it into existence.
The NCP was conceived in the wake of the anti-Hasina protests of 2024, when student groups and civil society actors rallied against what they described as authoritarian governance, electoral manipulation and economic mismanagement. Those protests culminated in the installation of an interim administration, with Yunus, the Nobel laureate economist, asked to steer the country towards elections. Many of the student organisers believed the moment demanded a new political force, one untainted by the polarised legacies of the past three decades.
Early declarations from NCP leaders positioned the party as a centrist alternative, promising institutional reform, accountability and a break from the cycle of winner-takes-all politics. At the time, analysts noted a surge of public curiosity, especially among urban youth and first-time voters, who expressed fatigue with the long-standing rivalry between the BNP and the Awami League. Yet curiosity has not translated into sustained momentum.
Several factors have undercut the NCP’s prospects. Organisational weakness remains the most pressing. Unlike its rivals, the party lacks deep-rooted district committees, experienced campaign managers and a tested fundraising apparatus. Efforts to build grassroots presence have been uneven, with reports of internal disagreements over candidate selection and policy priorities slowing decision-making.
The party’s perceived proximity to Yunus has also become a double-edged sword. While NCP figures deny formal patronage, many observers see the party as benefiting from the moral authority of the interim leader, particularly given its origins in the student movement that backed his appointment. Critics argue that this association blurs the line between the neutral caretaker role expected of the interim administration and partisan politics, a charge that has resonated among voters wary of unelected influence.
At the same time, the absence of the Awami League from the electoral arena has reshaped calculations. Rather than creating space for a third force, the ban has channelled opposition energy towards the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, both of which have moved swiftly to court constituencies previously aligned with Hasina’s party. Their campaigns have emphasised stability, governance experience and the promise of restoring democratic norms through familiar structures.
Public sentiment, according to multiple opinion soundings, suggests a cautious electorate prioritising predictability amid economic strain and regional uncertainty. Inflationary pressures, foreign exchange challenges and concerns over employment have sharpened demands for immediate solutions, an area where established parties argue their track records offer reassurance. The NCP’s reformist rhetoric, while appealing to some, has struggled to compete with these bread-and-butter appeals.
Internal voices within the student movement acknowledge the challenge. Several founders have spoken privately of underestimating the endurance of Bangladesh’s traditional party loyalties, particularly outside major cities. Others point to the difficulty of maintaining unity among activists who transitioned rapidly from protest coordination to party politics, a shift requiring compromise and hierarchy that sits uneasily with grassroots activism.